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THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE: ITS APPLICATION
IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
A and B are good friends. A owns a car and has a liability in-
surance policy which covers his liability while using the car. Sup-
pose B, with A's express permission, borrows the car to travel to a
near-by town (X) to see a ball game. Instead of returning after
the game B drives to another near-by town (Y) to visit his girl
friend. B is involved in an accident at an intersection in town Y.
Is B, the first permittee, covered by A's liability insurance policy?
Or suppose B takes his friend C along to the ball game. Then
B permits C to drive the car home after the game. A knows nothing
of C's presence in the car. C's negligent driving causes an accident
with resultant property damage to another car. Is C, the second
permittee, covered by A's liability insurance policy?
Problems such as these have provided a fertile field for litiga-
tion in this country.' The issue in such litigation usually is re-
solved to a determination of whether permission to use the auto-
mobile was given by the named insured.2 If the use of the automo-
' "Since the first standard automobile liability policy was promulgated
in 1936, the omnibus clause of the policy has been the subject of more
litigation than any other single clause." Austin, Permissive Use Under
the Omnibus Clause of the Automobile Liability Policy, 9 INS. COmSEL
J. 49 (1962).
"In many states, a gross and malformed body of case law, full ofbroadly conceived public policies and narrowly drawn semantic dis-
tinctions, has grown out of litigation involving the standard 'omnibus
clause' in comprehensive automobile liability insurance policies." Co-
hen & Cohen, Automobile Liability Insurance: Public Policy and the
Omnibus Clause in New Jersey, 15 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 155 (1961). See
generally, 5 A.L.R.2d 600 (1949); 126 A.L.R. 544 (1940); 106 A.L.R.
1251 (1937); 72 A.L.R. 1375 (1931); 41 A.L.R. 500 (1926); 6 BLAs MFIE,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 3943 (1945); Ashlock, Automo-
bile Liability Insurance: The Omnibus Clause, 46 IowA L. REv. 84
(1960).
2 The named insured in the omnibus clause and as used hereafter refers
only to the person specifically designated on the face of the policy. 7
APPLEMAN, INsURAN.CE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4354, at 234 (1962). Some
omnibus clauses provide other persons than the named insured with
the authority to grant permission to use the automobile. For exhaust-
ive articles treating the important question of who has authority to
give permission under these broader clauses, see Ashlock, Automobile
Liability Insurance: The Omnibus Clause, 46 IowA L. Rnv. 84, 91(1960); Austin, Permissive Use Under the Omnibus Clause of the Auto-
mobile Liability Policy, 29 INs. COUNSEL 3. 49 (1962).
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bile at the time of the accident was not permitted by the named
insured, the insurer is not liable for the damages. The particular
clause in the insurance policy which has to be interpreted to solve
these problems is the so-called "omnibus clause" which typically
reads as follows:
[T]he unqualified word "insured" includes the named insured and
also includes... any person while using an automobile covered by
this policy, and any person or organization legally responsible for
the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the
named insured or with his permission. 3
The insurer's intent under this clause is to provide liability coverage
to persons using the vehicle with the named insured's permission 4
even though they knew nothing about their liability coverage, paid
no consideration for the coverage, and had no independent insurable
interest.5 The broad purpose of the omnibus clause, as interpreted
by many courts, is the protection of the public against damages re-
sulting from accidents arising because of the negligent use of auto-
mobiles by irresponsible and uninsured users of automobiles.6
3 Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 78, 125 N.W.2d 179,
182 (1963). (Emphasis added.) See generally, Sweitzer, The Standard
Policy, 7 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1940). Prior to the 1930's the omnibus
clause of automobile insurance policies read substantially as follows:
"[T]he term 'insured' shall include the named insured and any person
while riding in or legally operating such automobile, and any other
person or organization legally responsible for its operation, provided
... it is being used with the permission of the named insured." Rowe,
The Standard Policy, I INS. COUNSEL J. 19 (1934). See 32 N.D.L. REv.
255 (1956) for history and development of the omnibus clause.
4 Permission may be express or implied. A good example of the finding
of implied permission is Coons v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 12
App. Div. 2d 701, 207 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1960). The plaintiff was riding as
a passenger in the rear seat of an automobile driven by his brother,
who suddenly stopped the automobile near the center of the street and
got out and walked away leaving the motor running, and two other
passengers also got out and followed the driver, leaving the plaintiff
as the sole occupant of the car. The plaintiff, who had no operator's
license at the time, got into the front seat, put the car in gear, and
attempted to move it from the center of the street. He panicked when
a police vehicle came along and he struck several automobiles. Under
such circumstances, it was implied that the plaintiff had permission to
drive the car and insurer was obligated to defend the plaintiff in an
action brought against him. In many instances, it is a jury question as
to whether permission existed. See Bekaert v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 230 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1959).
5 Haynes v. Linder, 323 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
6 This interpretation of the clause's purpose is used when the legislature
demands that the clause be included in the policy involved in the in-
dividual case. The purpose of the omnibus statute in Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1960), was declared in Protective Fire &
COMMENTS
This article will discuss the various judicial interpretations of
the omnibus clause. Special emphasis will be given to Nebraska
law as affected by the recent Nebraska Supreme Court decisions in
Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius7 and Metcalf v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co.8
II. RECENT NEBRASKA CASES INTERPRETING THE
OMNIBUS CLAUSE
In Protective,9 Martin Schwartzman, who operated a business
called Marty's Auto Parts, permitted Jerry Van Hoozer, his em-
ployee, to use one of Martin's cars, a 1941 Chevrolet. Van Hoozer
testified that the permission was to try out the auto with the even-
tual purpose of buying it. Martin testified, and the trial court
found, that the permission was limited to tinkering or working on
the automobile which did not include implied permission to try out
the vehicle.1 0
Van Hoozer, accompanied by his friend Glenda, took the car to
Van Hoozer's mother's home to show it to her. Van Hoozer per-
mitted Glenda to drive the car on the way back to her house. On
the way back she had an accident with an automobile owned and
operated by one Trenary.
The action arose under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1 to de-
termine coverage and the extent of liability under two automobile
Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 79, 125 N.W.2d 179, 182 (1963):
"The statute is remedial in nature and has for its purpose the protec-
tion of the public against damages resulting from accidents arising
because of the negligent use of automobiles by irresponsible and nonin-
sured permittees. The statute should be construed to accomplish the
purpose and policy of the legislation."
The court, in Protective, went on to say that the purpose of the
omnibus clause itself was "to fix the liability of additional insureds and
to eliminate ambiguities and defenses with reference thereto as a
matter of public policy." Id. at 78, 125 N.W.2d at 181 (1963). See gen-
eraly, Boyer v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359, 178
N.E. 523 (1931); Baesler v. Globe Indem. Co., 33 N.J. 148, 162 A.2d
854 (1960); Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 257 N.C. 381,
126 S.E.2d 161 (1962); Hinton v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America,
175 Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 279 (1940).
7 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
8 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471 (1964).
9 Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179
(1963).
10 Brief for Appellee, pp. 4, 12, Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius,
176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
11 176 Neb. at 76, 125 N.W.2d at 181.
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insurance policies alleged to cover the same automobile accident.
The Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. was Schwartzman's
insurer. The omnibus clause in their policy was the one involved
in the case. Protective Fire and Casualty Co. was Glenda's insurer.
Their policy covered Glenda's liability while she was driving a
non-owned automobile. Protective's liability was limited to liabil-
ity over and above other valid and collectible insurance.
The trial court held that Empire Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. was not liable for Glenda's and Van Hoozer's negligence under
the omnibus clause as interpreted in reference to the omnibus stat-
ute.12 The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding Empire pri-
marily liable for the negligence of both Glenda and Van Hoozer to
the extent of its policy limits. 13 The court reasoned that, since
Van Hoozer was using the automobile with Schwartzman's (the
named insured) permission, Empire was obligated to defend the
Trenary suit against both Glenda and Van Hoozer.
In Metcalf,14 the named insured was the City Sanitary Exter-
minating Co. The defendant was the insurer. The insurance liabil-
ity policy involved covered a 1958 Chevrolet station wagon. The
wording of the omnibus clause was the same as in the Protective
case.
15
Monroe Usher, president of the City Sanitary Exterminating
Co. and sole owner of its stock, gave his son Douglas permission to
use the car for the evening. Nothing was said about restrictive use
or operation of the station wagon that evening.16 Douglas, Robert
Holder, and two young ladies went to a basketball game. After-
wards Douglas developed a headache and let Holder do the driving.
Holder was involved in an accident out of which the litigation
arose. The court held that since the use of the car was with the
permission of the named insured, the operator, Robert Holder, was
an additional insured under the omnibus clause.1 7
12 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1960).
13 176 Neb. at 85, 125 N.W.2d at 185.
14 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471 (1964).
15 See note 4 supra.
16 "There is evidence in the record that Monroe Usher had told Douglas
on previous occasions that he was not to permit anyone else to drive
the family cars while he was using them. There is evidence in the
record that the automobile used by permission of the father was not
to be driven outside the city of Lincoln. The latter evidence is not
material here, for the reason that the accident did not occur during the
period of the alleged deviation." Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 176 Neb. 468, 471, 126 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1964).
17 176 Neb. at 475, 126 N.W.2d at 475.
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Before treating the meaning and implication of these decisions,
it may initially be of interest to examine other courts' handling of
problems arising from the interpretation and construction of the
omnibus clause.
III. WHEN FIRST PERMITTEES ARE ADDITIONAL
INSUREDS
The courts employ three basic doctrines' s in determining
whether a first permittee is an additional insured under the omni-
bus clause: (1) the conversion doctrine;19 (2) the initial permis-
sion doctrine;20 and (3) the minor deviation doctrine.2 1
Under the conversion doctrine, once the named insured gives
permission to use the vehicle, the permittee's liability is not covered
unless the use is reasonably within the scope of the permission
granted, within the time limits imposed by the parties, and operated
within the geographical limits contemplated by the parties.22
18 See generally, Putnam, The Standard Automobile Policy, What Persons
and Which Vehicles Are Covered, 11 ARK. L. REV. 20 (1956); 3 ALA. L.
REV. 419 (1950); 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 210 (1957); 22 LA. L. REv. 626 (1962);
46 McH. L. REV. 694 (1948); 36 MiNN. L. REV. 157 (1952); 32 N.D.L.
REV. 255 (1956); 28 TExAs L. REv. 719 (1950); 37 WASH. L. REv. 424
(1962).
19 E.g., Gibson v. Bruner, 406 Pa. 315, 178 A.2d 145 (1961); Exner v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 402 Pa. 473, 167 A.2d 703 (1961); Eagle Fire Co. v. Mullins, 238
S.C. 272, 120 S.E.2d 1 (1961); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anderson, 200
Va. 385, 105 S.E.2d 869 (1958); 7 APPLEmAN, INSURNsCE LAW & PRACTICE§ 4367 (1962); 7 Am. JuR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 120 (1963).
20 E.g., Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847
(7th Cir. 1957); Dominguez v. American Cas. Co., 217 La. 487, 46 So.
2d 744 (1950); Matits v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 488, 166 A.2d
345 (1960); 7 APPLmAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4366 (1962); 7
Am. JuR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 121 (1963).
21 E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 209 F.
Supp. 83 (N.D. W. Va. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Birm-
ingham Elec. Co., 254 Ala. 256, 48 So. 2d 41 (1950), noted in 3 ALA. L.
REV. 419 (1950); Speidel v. Kellum, 340 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App.
1960); Fehl v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 N.C. 440, 133 S.E.2d 68 (1963);
Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356 (1939);
Solitrero v. Maryland Cas. Co., 109 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); 7
APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4368 (1962); 7 Am. Jun. 2D
Automobile Insurance § 122 (1963).
22 "Probably the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the conversion rule,
namely, that where the use made of the automobile by the bailee suf-
ficiently exceeds the scope of the permission given so as to make the
bailee liable to the insured in an action for conversion such use is not
covered.... Nor is this an unreasonable rule. It would be odd,
rather, to say that the automobile is operated with the permission or
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Courts applying this doctrine generally say that coverage exists
as long as there are only minor and inconsequential deviations as
to time and place of operation.23 The reason for this extension can
best be illustrated by an example of the harsh results which flow
from a strict application of the rule. In Sauriolle v. O'Gorman,
24
coverage was denied when the first permittee, who was sent on an
errand to another city, had an accident during a detour of about
one-half mile from his prescribed route. The court reasoned:
If the consent to the initial possession of the car spells liability
regardless of the extent of the driver's departure from the per-
mitted use, then the insurer here would have been liable for any
injury inflicted by Shea's negligent operation of the car; as, for in-
stance, if, at the time of its occurrence, instead of making a detour
of a half mile, he had, without the owner's consent, been embarked
on a trip to Boston or to California. 25
The most liberal doctrine used by the courts is labeled the
initial permission or the "hell and high water" rule.26 Under this
doctrine, once the original permission to use the vehicle is given by
the named insured, the user is an additional insured no matter what
consent of the insured in order to impose liability on the insurer, and
yet to say that such use is not with the permission of the named in-
sured if he should sue the bailee for conversion. Of course, this does
not mean that every immaterial deviation would automatically cut off
the policy protection. It merely declares that such use must be reason-
ably within the intention of the parties at the time consent is given,
or a use to which the insured would have consented had he known of
it." 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4367 (1962).
23 Savage v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 158 Me. 259, 263-64, 182 A.2d
669, 671 (1962). The court said they would not deny coverage "where
the actual use is primarily for the purpose for which permission was
given and there are no more than minor deviations as to time and place
of operation. Under such circumstances the risk of accident is not
appreciably increased and permission would undoubtedly have been
given for such use if it had been sought. Under such a rule the insurer
entrusts to the insured the extension of policy coverage but full effect
is given to the restrictions imposed by the insured when he permits
the use of the insured vehicle by another. In these days when reduced
premiums are being offered to those who maintain a low level of acci-
dent liability, the ability of an insured owner to impose effective
restrictions on permitted use by another becomes important to the
insured as well as to the insurer." See also, Freshkorn v. Marietta,
345 Pa. 416, 29 A.2d 15 (1942).
24 86 N.H. 39, 47, 163 Atl. 717 (1932).
25 Id. at 47, 163 Atl. at 722.
26 Appleman originated the term "hell or high water." 7 APPLEMAN, IN-
SURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4366 (1962). It means that once a permittee
gets initial permission to use the car he may use the car in any manner
and still be an additional insured under the insurance policy.
COMMENTS
use he makes of the vehicle.27 All that has to be shown in these
liberal courts is that the user had initial permission to use the
car in some way (regardless of limitations and restrictions).
New Jersey accepted the initial permission rule in Matits v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 28 In dissent, Judge Hall mentioned that
the initial permission rule had never met with great favor2 9 in the
courts and argued that-the initial permission rule was too radical
and such a rule should be adopted by the legislature in the first
instance:
The "initial permission" rule, with the extreme results it dictates,
rests upon a broad conception of policy that a shift to it, or indeed
its adoption in the first instance, should come only from the Legis-
lature, which alone can properly determine its desirability and
control its ramifications.30
The judicial trend today seems to be to find a middle ground
between the two extreme rules. This intermediate position is
known as the "minor deviation" rule. This doctrine holds that once
27 "In support of the liberal rule it has been reasoned that the language
of the omnibus clause which provides that the insured should include
any person operating the insured's automobile with the permission of
the insured is not restricted, but is used in its broadest possible sense,
and under the rules of construction generally applicable, the language
used must be given a broad construction and such words would be
practically meaningless and the object of such a clause made nugatory
if it were necessary to determine in every case whether, at the time
and under the circumstances of the accident, the driver was proceeding
within the limitations of the permission of the insured to use the car.
Also, it has been said that where the legislature had enacted a compre-
hensive scheme of motor vehicle legislation designed to assure that
persons who cause automobile accidents are able to answer financially
to their innocent victims, the liberal or 'initial permission' rule which
is based on a broad interpretation of the omnibus clause should be
adopted rather than the conversion or minor deviation rules which are
based on narrower interpretations of the clause, since under these two
rules coverage turns on the scope of permission given in the first in-
stance, rendering coverage uncertain in many cases, fostering litigation
as to the existence or extent of any alleged deviations, and ultimately
inhibiting the achievement of the legislative goal." 7 Am. Ju . 2D Auto-
mobile Insurance § 121 (1963).
28 33 N.J. 488, 166 A.2d 345 (1960).
29 Id. at 498, 166 A.2d at 350. See also Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No.
America, 257 N.C. 381, 387, 126 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1962), where the court
stated: "It does not seem reasonable to assume that parties to an
insurance contract covering a vehicle used in business contemplate an
indiscriminate use for the social and separate business purposes of
employees of named insured unless permission, express or implied, is
given for such additional uses. To hold that the scope of any permis-
sion cannot be limited would be strange ......
80 33 N.J. 488, 498, 166 A.2d 345, 350 (1960).
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the user gets original permission from the named insured, he is an
insured unless he deviates grossly from the original permission.3 1
The basis of this rule is that it most nearly approximates the in-
tention of the contracting parties and the risk contemplated by the
insured.
3 2
There is a very thin line between the conversion doctrine as it
is applied by the courts and the minor deviation doctrine. One
court has said that the minor deviation doctrine is not really a
separate rule at all.33
The earlier liability policies provided that any person using
the car with the permission of the named insured was an additional
insured.34 In order to reverse the trend of liberal decisions, the in-
surance companies changed the standard omnibus clause to provide
that the actual use had to be with the named insured's permission.
The addition of the word actual was an obvious attempt to convince
the courts that the construction intended by the contracting parties
was embodied in the conversion rule rather than the more liberal
views.3 5
31 "The 'minor deviation' rule, followed in the majority of jurisdictions,
seems to me to be the only sound one so long as the extent of coverage
is allowed to be governed by the unilateral act of the insured and the
standard omnibus clause is permitted by the appropriate supervising
authority. Prohibitions and restrictions as to use in all its elements
are thereby regarded in accordance with the contract and not cast
aside. I would, however, recognize such only where they amount to
more than a mere admonition and the assured primarily had in mind
the risk of accident. Those having some other basis, such as family
discipline or personal convenience of the owner, should not be given
controlling effect. Absent applicable prohibition or restriction, cover-
age would depend, objectively, on the use at the time having some
connection with that permitted and not being so grossly different that
it could be unquestionably said the owner would have prohibited it
had he been expressly advised. All situations can be fairly determined
on this basis." Matits v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 488, 506, 166
A.2d 345, 354 (1960) (dissent).
32 Wallin v. Knudtson, 46 Wash. 2d 80, 278 P.2d 344 (1955).
33 "The 'minor deviation' rule is, in reality, not a rule at all. It necessarily
turns upon the facts in each case, being a modification of the other two
rules and depending entirely upon the extent of the deviation. It
would seem to afford little opportunity for uniformity in application
because of the difficulty, in any event, of saying whether a deviation
is slight or gross. At best it provides an escape from either of the other
two more extreme rules, presenting the opportunity for endless litiga-
tion in seeking a definition of the extent of the deviation in each case."
Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir.
1958).
34 See note 3 supra.
85 7 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAw & PRAcTIcE § 4354 (1962).
COMMENTS
This construction of the words actual use was recognized by
some courts, 36 but many refused to change their former interpreta-
tions and refused to find that the word actual made any change.
37
Courts which adopted the actual use distinction have construed it
to mean that the very use (particular use) to which the car was
being put at the time of the accident had to be permitted by the
named insured or there would be no coverage for the user. 8  This
is simply the conversion doctrine.
In addition to the above doctrines, Chief Justice Weintraub of
the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested in dissent that permission
to use could come either before or after the accident which caused
liability.39 Chief Justice Weintraub's ratification argument has lit-
tle support in agency or contract law. Ratification is the affirmance
by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was
done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some
or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him.40
This doctrine does not conform to the law of insurance contracts
because it can be exercised without consideration to or manifesta-
36 Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d
161 (1962); Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949);
Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 44 A.2d 770 (1945); Messer v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 19, 241 S.W.2d 856 (1961).
37 Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App. 2d 69, 173
N.E.2d 543 (1961); Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 215 La.
349, 40 So. 2d 746 (1949); Hauser v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 187 So. 684
(La. Ct. App. 1939); Collins v. New York Cas. Co., 140 W. Va. 1, 82
S.E.2d 288 (1954).
38 "It can mean nothing else." Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 34 F. Supp.
870, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1940).
39 "[S]uppose the named insured, for the purpose of disciplining his err-
ing son ... denies him the use of the car for 30 days or during certain
hours of the day. I think it would be absurd to hold the son who vio-
lated the prohibition was beyond the protection of the policy. That is
the last thought the father would have had in mind. In brief the
named insured may deny or restrict "permission" for reasons wholly
foreign to insurance coverage and with no intention whatever to deny
the policy protection he bought. The carrier should not be permitted
to make capital of such privately motivated actions." Baesler v. Globe
Indem. Co., 33 N.J. 148, 157, 162 A.2d 854, 859-60 (1960). "Since the
named insured is vested with plenary power to determine who shall
benefit under the contract, it should not matter whether the named
insured's approval preceded or followed the use of the car. The named
insured's interest in affording that protection is no less after than be-
fore the event. To deny the authority of the named insured to forgive
or to ratify is to visit consequences he surely did not want." Id. at
158-59, 162 A.2d at 860.
40 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 82 (1958).
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tion by the purported principal and without fresh consent by the
other party.
The District Court of the United States for the Nebraska Dis-
trict expressly rejected this argument and said that permission to
use had to exist prior to the accident.41
IV. WHEN SECOND PERMITTEES ARE ADDI-
TIONAL INSUREDS
The tougher problem presented in Protective and Metcalf in-
volves the question of when a second permittee user is or should be
included as an additional insured within the meaning and intent of
the omnibus clause. 42
There is no problem if A, named insured, says to B, the first
permittee, "You may use the car in any way you wish, and you may
let C use the car in any way he wishes." In this case it would be
obvious that C would be using the car with the named insured's
permission. The questions arise when the named insured gives
permission to B to use the car with no instructions as to allowing
others to use the car.
Here, we are faced with the distinction between use and opera-
tion. The two words are not synonymous and cannot be used inter-
changeably. 43 Use is defined: "'Act of employing anything, or state
of being employed; application; employment.' Roget's Thesaurus
gives as synonyms, 'employment, application (to a purpose)' and
others.144 Operation means the direction and control of the auto-
mobile's mechanism for the purpose of propelling.45 When a per-
son is riding in a car he is using it.4 6 When he is operating or driv-
41 "A subsequent expression of willingness to have done an act necessary
to establish contractual relationship, after rights have become fixed,
cannot supply the legal gap existing from the act having not in fact
been done." Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 194 F.2d 785
(8th Cir. 1952). See also, Bekaert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
230 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1956).
42 See generally, 22 LA. L. REv. 626 (1962); 32 N.D.L. REV. 255 (1956); 37
WASH. L. REV. 424 (1962).
43 Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179
(1963); Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N.W. 333 (1941).
44 Persellin v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 75 N.D. 716, 722, 32 N.W.2d 644, 647
(1948).
45 Freeman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 147 Conn. 713, 716, 166 A.2d 455,
457 (1960).
46 "Certainly, it would be a narrower application of the term used, ig-
noring the general considerations mentioned, to require one using the
car to use it in its entirety. The daughter of the insured was using the
COMMENTS
ing the vehicle he is also using it. So driving and riding are two
types of use. Of course, there are other ways in which a car may be
used.47
If A grants B permission (without any other restrictions) to
use the car by operating it, it would seem correct to assume that
there is implied permission for C to use the car by riding in it, but
not to use the car by operating it. The majority of courts so hold.48
There are, however, numerous exceptions to this general rule.
Some courts do not apply this rule when the first permittee
remains a passenger in the automobile. These courts say that the
named insured is held to have given implied permission to a third
person to drive when the first permittee, to whom the car was en-
trusted by the named insured without any express prohibition
against letting another drive, retains possession of the car but turns
over its operation to another while such first permittee remains an
occupant of the car.49
seat, which she occupied. She was using the sides and top to shelter
her from the weather. She was using the wheels and tires, for upon
them she was propelled through space. She was using the motor of
the car, for by its power the vehicle in which she was riding was pro-
pelled along the road. Is all of this use to be ignored, simply because
she did not hold the wheel-manipulate the gear shift, press the accel-
erator or brake pedal? Manifestly, this is restricting the full reason-
able words, which the insured has written." American Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 52 F. Supp. 601, 603 (N.D. IIl. 1943). See also, Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A.2d 393 (1942); Brown v.
Kennedy, 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E.2d 857 (1943).
47 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960) (using the vehi-
cle as a gun rest); Wiebel v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 51 Del.
151, 140 A.2d 712 (Super. Ct. 1958) (pushing vehicle by hand); Bolton
v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (slamming
the door); Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 348 Mich. 531, 83
N.W.2d 434 (1957) (releasing hand brake, and turning wheels); Cole-
train v. Coletrain, 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d 89 (1961) (slamming the
door); Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wash. 2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941) (loading
and unloading a vehicle). See generally, 7 APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW
& PRACTICE § 4354 (1962); 11 MERCER L. REV. 391 (1960).
48 E.g., Peterson v. Sunshine Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1960);
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847 (7th
Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1956); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. De Maison, 213 F.2d 826 (3rd Cir.
1954); Haynes v. Linder, 323 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Baesler
v. Globe Indem. Co., 33 N.J. 148, 162 A.2d 854 (1960). See generally,
15 ALA. L. REV. 610 (1963); 9 VAND. L. REV. 569 (1956).
49 E.g., Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847
(7th Cir. 1957); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 30 m.
App. 2d 69, 173 N.E.2d 543 (1961); Constanzo v. Pennsylvania Thresh-
ermen Ins. Co., 30 N.J. 262, 152 A.2d 589 (1959); Maurer v. Fesing, 233
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Cases in which the first permittee is not a passenger, but
where the courts have found implied permission for the third per-
son (second permittee) to operate include: (1) where the third
person is engaged in some errand or activity for the benefit, advan-
tage, convenience,5" or purpose of the first permittee;51 (2) where
the named insured has knowledge that the first permittee is loaning
the use of the vehicle to others and nevertheless remains silent;52
Wis. 565, 290 N.W. 191 (1940). See generally, 6 Am. U.L. REv. 47
(1957); 9 VAND. L. REV. 569 (1956).
50 Third Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 S.W.2d 261
(Ky. 1960). The named insured had gone overseas and left his
car with his father and brothers. Tom, one of the brothers, took
two girls to a ball game and let one of them take the car to a restau-
rant while he played ball. The driver caused an accident. The court
held that she was an insured under the omnibus clause. "We have no
difficulty in concluding that the blanket permission given by Claude
Sammons for his brother Tom to use the car while he was overseas
was broad enough to imply the further authority on Tom's part to
permit its operation by a third person for a purpose incidental to
Tom's own use of the car, and for Tom's convenience. The facts in
this case show that Tom did not himself drive the girls to the restau-
rant because he had to get to the ball game and did not have time.
He had brought them from Raceland to Ashland, and they were under
his protection. When he let Joyce have the car to go to the restaurant
it was as much (or more) for his own convenience as for hers, for it
relieved him, as her escort, of taking her himself. Similarly, on a
previous occasion when they had arrived almost at game time Joyce
had parked the car so that Tom would lose no time getting onto the
playing field. Claude Sammons having left the car for the general,
unlimited use of his father and brothers, that one or more of them
might permit its occasional and temporary operation by a third party
under conditions so natural as in this case can reasonably be assumed
to have been expected by him, and thus embraced within the author-
ity conferred on the father and brothers. Therefore, Joyce Sewell was
included within the definition of "insured" under the policy." Id. at
262-63.
51 E.g., Duff v. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co., 296 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1961);
Harrison v. Carrol, 139 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1943); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Mathis, 232 Ark. 484, 339 S.W.2d 132 (1960); Third Nat'l Bank v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1960); Longwell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 440 (La. Ct. App. 1953);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 89 N.H. 95, 193 Atl. 233 (1937). But
see, Baesler v. Globe Indem. Co., 33 N.J. 148, 155, 162 A.2d 854, 858
(1960): "Neither our own research nor that of counsel has turned up
a single case holding that a second permittee, who uses an insured
automobile for his own purposes, unaccompanied by the first permit-
tee, and against the express instructions of the named insured as to
use, is nonetheless using the automobile with the permission of the
named insured."
52 American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 73 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App.
1947), rehearing denied, 74 N.E.2d 748, (Ind. Ct. App. 1947); Shoup v.
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and (3) where for all practical purposes the first permittee is the
real owner of the car but title has been taken in the name of the
named insured for reasons of convenience. The courts reason that
the first permittee stands in the shoes of the named insured, so
therefore permission flowing from the first permittee is held to be
with the implied permission of the named insured. 3 This latter
doctrine is based on the broadness of the initial grant of permis-
sion from the named insured to the first permittee, which has to
be determined as a question of fact.54 It is interesting to note that
in all of these cases the court has reached the conclusion by finding
some type of implied permission for the second permittee to operate
the automobile.
It has been argued that the second permittee must get express
permission from the named insured before the omnibus clause cov-
ers his liability.5
5
The most liberal view taken by the courts on the issue of when
Clemans, 31 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939); Odden v. Union Indem.
Co., 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).
53 E.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rollason, 246 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1957);
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 402, 178 A.2d
358 (App. Div. 1962); Krebsbach v. Miller, 22 Wis. 2d 171, 125 N.W.2d
408 (1963). Contra, Samuels v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 150 F.2d 221
(10th Cir. 1945).
General permission is much more readily implied if the permission
is for a social rather than a business purpose. Jordan v. Shelby Mut.
Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1944); Trinkle v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Scott v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 273 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. 1954).
54 7 Am. JuR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 116 (1963); 7 APPLEmAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4365 (1962).
55 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 605, 608-09, 45 S.W.2d 52,
53 (1932): "The insurer has a right to assume that the risk he under-
takes shall not be enlarged. The extent of the risk is the basis of all
tabulated premium charges. And this is one of the forms of insurance,
of which fire policies are an illustration, wherein there is a recognized
personal element resting on standards of character, responsibility, and
competence. In this class of cases, theoretically, certainly, the insurer
looks first to the standing and reputation of the named insured, and
trusts him to select and delegate to responsible employees, only, the
'use' or operation-controlling, guiding, driving-of its cars covered, and
on this theory agrees to cover such 'additional assured.' No power
passes, in the contemplation of the parties, to such an agent to delegate
in turn this responsibility. Such a diversion of use can hardly be said
to be impliedly with the consent of the named assured, or within the
contemplation of the insurer. It is a departure too radical and foreign,
and involves an unjustifiable extension of the risk covered by the
contract."
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a second permittee is given liability coverage is illustrated by two
recent cases decided in Connecticut and New Jersey.
In Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co.,56 the named
insured gave the car to her salesman, Smith, to take a group of
people to Philadelphia to tour a brewery. On the way back, one of
the guests was driving when the accident occurred. The guest had
been expressly prohibited from driving by the named insured. The
court held that the driver was an insured under the omnibus clause,
saying:
Since in this context the words operation and use have different
meanings and the omnibus clause requires only that the use of the
automobile be with the permission of the named insured, any pro-
hibition as to the operation of the automobile is immaterial to a
determination of coverage. Thus, even though a driver has been
expressly prohibited from operating the car, he is covered if the car
was being used for a purpose permitted by the named insured. 57
Commenting on the New Jersey case, the court, in Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., said:
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the factual situation in
the New Jersey case fits the second line of decisions noted above in
that the use was authorized and the first permittee was in the car at
the time of the accident. Disdaining to decide the case in accord-
ance with this line of authorities, the New Jersey court chose to
base its finding of coverage on the holding that it is not necessary
to find either express or implied permission or authority running
from the owner to the driver; that the necessary permission must
be found only with respect to the use and not to the driver.58
In Freeman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,59 the named insured
corporation's president directed Freeman to chauffeur Mrs. Clement
to visit her daughter. On the way back, Mrs. Clement was driving
when the accident happened. The court held Mrs. Clement to be
an insured, saying:
Had it been the intention of the defendant when it wrote the terms
of the contract of insurance to limit the application of the omnibus
clause to situations in which the operation of the automobile rather
than the use to which it was being put was determinative, the de-
fendant could have done so by including the word "operation" in
the policy.60
56 33 N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355 (1960), commented on in Cohen & Cohen,
Automobile Liability Insurance: Public Policy and the Omnibus
Clause in New Jersey, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (1961). See also, 3 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 520 (1962).
57 33 N.J. at 514, 166 A.2d at 358. See also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 73 N.J. Super. 407, 180 A.2d 168 (App. Div. 1962).
5S8 209 F. Supp. 83, 86 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
59 147 Conn. 713, 166 A.2d 455 (1960). Accord, Persellin v. State Auto.
Ins. Ass'n, 75 N.D. 716, 32 N.W.2d 644 (1948).
60 147 Conn. at 716, 166 A.2d at 457.
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Both of these courts read the requirement of permission to use
the car by operating it right out of the omnibus clause.61
V. WHERE NEBRASKA STANDS
In Protective, the district court of Lancaster County found that
Van Hoozer had permission only to work on the 1941 Chevrolet.
Van Hoozer had testified that he had permission to try out the auto-
mobile.62 The supreme court said it was immaterial what the initial
permission provided, if there was permission to use the car in
some way.63 The court adopted the rule that a deviation from
the permitted use is immaterial, the only essential factor being that
permission be given for some use in the first instance. It appears
that Nebraska can now be included with the rest of the states that
recognize the liberal initial permission rule.64
The court, in Protective, recognized that the words in the policy
itself (actual use) meant that the conversion rule should be fol-
lowed. 5 Then they reasoned that the words actual use were super-
seded by the word using because of the omnibus statute. The ap-
plication of this statute to the policy in the case was severely ques-
tioned by appellee's counsel and amicus curiae on the motion for
rehearing.66 By applying this statute as a part of the policy, the
61 In both of these cases, the car was being used within the original per-
mission (trip to brewery in Indemnity and trip to visit daughter in
Freeman).
The Illinois court in Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 28 ill. 2d 601,
607, 192 N.E.2d 855, 859 (1963), criticized the judicial removal of the
requirement of permission to use the car by driving it: "When the
insured purchases extended coverage he seeks to protect those whom
he allows to use his car from the risks of financial disaster as he would
guard them against danger from mechanical defects. Ordinarily he
has no interest in buying protection for those who use his car without
permission. The insurer, on the other hand, limits the risk assumed
by requiring permission, since usually the insured will use discretion
in permitting others to use his car, if only as a matter of self-interest
in avoiding damage to his property." See also, 15 ALA. L. REv. 610(1963).
62 Brief for Appellee, p. 8, Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb.
75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
63 176 Neb. at 79, 125 N.W.2d at 182.
64 See note 20 supra.
65 176 Neb. at 82, 125 N.W.2d at 184.
66 NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1960) reads: "Liability policy;
owner's policy; contents. Such owner's policy of liability insurance:(1) Shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference
all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be
granted; and (2) shall insure the person named therein and any other
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court was able to skirt the actual use meaning and interpret using
under the liberal view.
It appears that the court, in Protective, used the omnibus stat-
ute as a device to escape the restrictive meaning of actual use.
Since the court, in Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., expressly
rejected the difference between use and actual use67 it would seem
that it would not now be necessary to apply the statute to every
liability policy in order to employ the initial permission doctrine as
a judicial tool. The court, in Metcalf, did not have to apply the
initial permission doctrine because the use of the car was within
the scope of the named insured's initial permission, while in Pro-
tective the trial court expressly found that the use at the time of
the accident was not within the scope of the initial permission.
If the court had been forced to apply the initial permission doc-
trine in Metcalf to reach the result, it is suggested that it would
have used the doctrine without reference to the omnibus statute.
Perhaps then, the Metcalf decision means that the omnibus statute
does not supersede every automobile policy omnibus clause as was
thought by some who analyzed the Protective case.68
The application of the initial permission doctrine clearly re-
verses the judicial thinking in Nebraska as to when a first per-
mittee is covered as an additional insured.69 In Witthauer v. Em-
ployers' Mut. Cas. Co.,7 0 an employee used a truck for personal
person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against
loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
...." (Emphasis added.) This statute is found in the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-501 to -569 (Reissue
1960). The argument made by counsel for Empire on request for
rehearing was that NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1960) was not
applicable to the policy of Schwartzman. Section 60-534 was said to
specifically relate back to section 60-533 which dealt with only pol-
icies of liability insurance required to be certified as provided in sec-
tions 60-529 to 60-531 as proof of financial responsibility after a prev-
ious revocation or suspension of driver's privileges. Schwartzman's
policy was not one required to be certified under the Safety Respon-
sibility Act and therefore counsel for Empire argued that the omnibus
statute did not apply to the liability policy in this case. See 34 NEB.
L. REv. 675 (1955) for a discussion of the Safety Responsibility Act.
67 176 Neb. 468, 472, 126 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1964).
68 Brief for Amici Curiae, Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 176 Neb.
468, 126 N.W.2d 471 (1964).
69 The Nebraska cases are discussed in Risjord, Automobile Liability
Insurance, 38 NEB. L. REV. 245 (1959).
70 149 Neb. 728, 32 N.W.2d 413 (1948).
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purposes contrary to his instructions. The court recognized the
actual use distinction and said that this deviation was enough to
remove the driver from coverage under the omnibus clause. This
application of the conversion rule is no longer valid law after
Protective and Metcalf.
In Belcaert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,7 1 the federal
district court, in interpreting an automobile policy, incorporated
the omnibus statute into the policy. They did not use the rationale
of Protective, however. The court said that
Nebraska has never made any such liberal or extreme interpretation
and application of its statutory omnibus-clause prescription ... as
that any permission, whether general or special, given by a named
insured to the use of the automobile by another, will, as a matter of
law, extend coverage to the permittee in whatever use he may make
of the car, unless his possession thereof shall have become unlawful
as against the named insured .... 72
Nebraska has now accepted the above rule as a result of Protective
and Metcalf.
VI. WHEN SECOND PERMITTEES ARE COVERED
In Protective, the trial court expressly found that Glenda had
no express or implied permission to drive the car.73 In spite of this
and in spite of the rule that findings of fact by a court in a law
action have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless clearly wrong, the court said that the issue was one of
law and the findings of fact were immaterial.7 4 The Nebraska court
thus found that, even when Glenda had no permission from the
named insured to drive the car, she was still an insured under the
omnibus clause as superseded by the omnibus statute and Schwartz-
man's insurer, Empire, was obligated to defend any actions for
negligence brought against her.75
If the trial court had accepted the testimony that the permis-
sion was to try out the car with the eventual purpose of buying it,
they could easily have found that Glenda had implied permission
from Schwartzman to operate the car. Cases have held that a car
dealer who lends a car for a tryout by a potential customer im-
pliedly consents to operation by the customer's family and social
71 230 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1956).
72 Id. at 129.
73 Brief for Appellee, pp. 4, 12, Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius,
176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
74 176 Neb. at 85, 125 N.W.2d at 185.
75 Ibid.
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group.76 Glenda, Van Hoozer's friend, would probably fit into this
category.7
7
The trial court, even accepting that the permission was only to
work on the car, could have followed the line of cases which hold
that as long as the first permittee is a passenger permission by im-
plication of law arises when a second permittee operates the car.78
In Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,7 9 the federal dis-
trict court ruled that, where the named insured allowed her foster
son to use the car and the foster son allowed a friend to drive, the
friend was not an insured under the omnibus clause. The court
recognized, but did not follow, the above rule as to a second per-
mittee:
[C]onsent given to an original permittee to use the automobile, un-
less specifically limited in fact, constitutes, for purposes of the
standard omnibus clause, consent by implication of law to a use
thereof by a second permittee to serve some purpose, benefit or ad-
vantage of the first permittee, such as where the original permittee
is riding in the car or the car is being driven in his interest or for a
purpose mutual to him and the second permittee8 0
The court, in Protective and Metcalf, could have reached the
same result in the case by applying the above rule. The court,
however, did not discuss permission or consent by implication of
law, but saw fit to find coverage without finding permission for
the second permittee to drive the car.
As a result of these decisions, all that is required in Nebraska
for a second permittee to be an additional insured under the omni-
bus clause is for the first permittee to get permission of some kind
to use the car. Then, as long as the first permittee is a passenger
in the car, he may delegate the driving to anyone and the driver is
covered. Instead of reaching a result based upon implied permis-
sion to operate, it seems that the court has read permission out of
the omnibus clause and statute. Thus Nebraska appears to follow
the rationale of Freeman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.81 and Indem-
nity Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. 8 2
76 American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 93 N.H. 101, 36
A.2d 284 (1944).
77 There was conflict in the testimony as to whether Glenda was engaged
to Van Hoozer. Schwartzman had seen them together several times
and knew they were close friends.
78 See note 49 supra.
79 194 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1952).
80 Id. at 787.
81 147 Conn. 713, 166 A.2d 455 (1960).
82 33 N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355 (1960).
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The Nebraska court, in Protective, went even further than these
two cases. In those cases the use for which the car was being em-
ployed while the second permittee drove was within the original
permission.83 In Protective, the permission was only to tinker with
the car, and the car was being used to drive between Jerry's moth-
er's house and Glenda's house. Metcalf seems to be squarely in ac-
cord with Freeman and Indemnity in that the use of the car in
Metcalf was within the scope of the original permission.8 4
The court, in Protective, thus applied the two most liberal rules
of omnibus clause interpretation in the same case. This double ap-
plication goes further than any of the courts which apply either of
the rules. The courts which apply the two rules have never ap-
plied them simultaneously as did the Nebraska court in Protective.
VIL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
When an insurer and insured agree on an insurance policy, the
consideration for the contract is decided upon a basis of the risk
involved. The insurer assumes the risk of liability arising out of
any use of the vehicle by the named insured and agrees to grant
him coverage for any liability arising therefrom. The insurance
company, through the omnibus clause, also assumes the risk of
liability arising from the use of the vehicle by a person permitted
by the named insured to so use. Therefore, the use which caused
the liability must be by the named insured or with the named in-
sured's permission. In Protective, the use that caused liability was
Glenda's negligent operation of the car. This use was found not to
have been permitted by the named insured. It is suggested that
this risk was never accepted by the insurer and the two contracting
parties never so intended that an unpermitted use which caused
liability should be covered.
Here is where the difficulties of defining the word use or using
cause a sticky problem. Glenda was using the car to get back to her
home. She was also using the car by operating it. Robert Holder
was using the car for dating purposes. He was also using the car
by operating it. The use by operation is the use upon which liabil-
ity must be grounded. Under the omnibus clause, if the use which
83 See note 61 supra.
84 Metcalf v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471
(1964). In Harper v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 509-
10, 111 N.W.2d 480, 486 (1961), the court stated: "[I]mplied authority
to delegate permission to the use of the car by another is restricted to
the same use for which the initial permission was given .... " See
also, Feirich, The Omnibus Clause, 50 ILL. B.J. 610 (1962).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 1
caused liability was not permitted, the user could not be an addi-
tional insured.
Further, when Marty gave Van Hoozer permission to use the
car, it could be implied that he also gave him permission to allow
friends to ride in the car while Van Hoozer was driving it. Now
suppose, by some strange fact situation, that Glenda became liable
to a third party because of her negligence while riding in the car.
8 5
She would then be an insured on an implied permission theory be-
cause her permitted use had given rise to her liability. Clearly,
Van Hoozer would have been an insured under the initial permis-
sion theory, but he was not the cause of the accident and, therefore,
was not liable for damages to Trenary, the other car owner.
The Nebraska court refused to overrule the trial court's finding
of no implied permission for Glenda to drive. Since her liability
was founded upon an unpermitted use of the car, it would seem that
permission no longer has any meaning in the omnibus clause cases
as applied to second permittees while the first permittee is riding
in the car.
The real basis for the Protective and Metcalf decisions lies in
the broad purpose, implied in the omnibus clause and statute, of
protecting the public against damages resulting from accidents
arising from the negligent use of automobiles by irresponsible and
non-insured permittees8 6
If the court, in Protective, had gone the other way and held Em-
pire not primarily liable for Glenda's liability, it is probable that
Trenary would have had no compensation from a liability insurer
for his damages, since Protective's non-owner clause in Glenda's
policy required that before Glenda was covered under the policy she
had to be using the non-owned auto with the owner's permission. 7
The court, in fact, held that Protective had to pay anything above
the collectible insurance from Empire even in spite of the fact that
Glenda had no permission to drive from Schwartzman. 8 The court
thus held both insurance companies liable without discussing im-
plied permission.
The effect of applying the initial permission doctrine as to first
permittees and erasing permission as to second permittees who op-
85 A passenger who grabbed the steering wheel became liable as a user
in Thibodeaux v. Brown Oil Tools, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. La.
1961).
88 See note 6 supra.
87 Brief for Appellant, p. 21, Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176
Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
88 176 Neb. at 85, 125 N.W.2d at 185.
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erate the car will be to attach insurance coverage to the car as long
as the first permittee gets permission to use the car and remains in
it either as a driver or a passenger. This could cause an increase in
insurance rates in order to compensate for the added risk of liabil-
ity for accidents caused within the wide scope of these two doc-
trines. 'Whether a substantial increase would be necessary remains
to be seen.
The important question revolves around who should innovate
these new policies regarding liability insurance: the court, the legis-
lature, or the insured person himself. In Continental Cas. Co. v.
Padgett, the court said in regard to accepting the liberal initial
permission rule:
The decisions mentioned in the last cited case which take the
so-called liberal or extreme view have been again pressed upon us
on this appeal and have been again considered; but we find our-
selves unable to follow them. In the absence of legislation requir-
ing automobile policies to provide for broader coverage than is af-
forded by the usual omnibus clause, we do not feel justified in ex-
tending the terms of the insurance contract beyond its plain mean-
ing.8 9
It would seem that the legislature is the body that should be
the innovator of such extremely liberal policies. They are better
equipped to study the needs of the insurance buying public. The
two liberal doctrines laid down in Protective and Metcalf may not
have any drastic effects on the insurance premium rates, but per-
haps some previous investigation would have been advisable °0
It is interesting to note that the standard form of the family
automobile liability insurance omnibus clause has again been
changed, apparently to combat interpretations such as used by the
Nebraska court. The changed omnibus clause now reads:
[A]ny person using the automobile with the permission of the
named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operat-
ing) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such per-
mission .... 91
It is difficult to say whether the court will accept this clause.
An acceptance of this clause would require a different result in a
89 219 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1955).
90 A person may insure himself against damages caused by an uninsured
motorist by purchasing a comprehensive collision policy, or a medical
payment policy. Neb. Laws c. 342, p. 1093 (1963) requires that each
auto liability policy offers an uninsured motorist clause which will
protect the driver to a $10,000 unit per person.
91 Risjord, Some Phases of Omnibus Automobile Liability Insurance, 40
DENsvE L. CEN=TE J. 241 (1963). (Emphasis added.) This change was
suggested in Austin, Permissive Use Under the Omnibus Clause of the
Automobile Liability Policy, 29 INs. CoUNsEL T. 49 (1962).
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case like Protective. Perhaps the court will reject the clause and
again say that the statute supersedes it. This remains to be seen.
The meaning of the clause is obvious. If a person has no permis-
sion from the named insured to drive the car, he is not an additional
insured.
The two Nebraska cases probably reached correct results. The
only problem is the way in which the results were reached. In
both cases, there was ample precedent consistent with general rules
of contract interpretation to hold that the second permittees
(Glenda in Protective and Holder in Metcalf) had implied permis-
sion to drive the cars. This reasoning could have been used even
under the recently changed clause. The doctrine of implied per-
mission is readily adaptable to the omnibus clause problems. It
remains to be seen if the court will ignore the new language of the
omnibus clause or return to the better doctrine of implied per-
mission.92
Vince Dowding '65
92 See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
